Nothing but the Truth-in-L

Upcoming talks of interest at the Alabama Philosophical Society meeting

2009-09-24T01:37:24Z

The Alabama Philosophical Society's fall meeting runs October 2-3, 2009, in Orange Beach, AL. While a full schedule is here, three talks of particular interest to readers of this blog are the following:

[Editor's note: I deleted the previously posted times and days because of revisions to the schedule. See above link for most recent schedule.]

Chase Wrenn (U. of Alabama), "Truth is Not Instrumentally Valuable" (abstract)

Marcus Rossberg (U Conn), "Inferentialism and Conservativeness" (abstract)

Adam Podlaskowski (Fairmont State U.), "Semantic Pluralism and Semantic Functionalism" (abstract)

I hope to see you there!

NDPR of Interest: Truth as One and Many, by Michael Lynch (UCONN)

2009-09-21T18:41:01Z

Review by Stewart Shapiro (The Ohio State University/Arché Research Center, University of St. Andrews) is here.

NDPR of Interest: Truth and Truth-Making, Lowe and Rami (eds.)

2009-08-19T15:19:15Z

Review by David Efird (University of York) is here.

CFP - INPC 13 - Reference and Referring

2009-08-19T15:10:59Z

The website for this conference is here. Below is the announcement, as received through Philosophy Updates:

13th annual

Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference

Topic: Reference and Referring

Dates: April 30 - May 2, 2010

Location: Moscow, ID & Pullman, WA

The Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference is a topic-focused,
interdisciplinary conference on philosophical themes, co-sponsored by
the Philosophy Departments at the University of Idaho and Washington
State University. This meeting will focus on reference and referring,
two topics of traditional interest in the philosophy of language,
linguistics, and psychology.

Keynote Speaker: David Kaplan (UCLA)

Other participants include...

]]> State), David Boersema (Pacific), David Braun (SUNY-Buffalo), John
Campbell (Berkeley), Eros Corazza (Carleton), Mark Crimmins (Stanford),
Robin Jeshion (UC Riversice), Genoveva Marti (Barcelona), Sarah Moss
(Michigan), Stephen Neale (CUNY), Michael Nelson (UC Riverside), John
Perry (Stanford & UC Riverside), Gillian Russell (Washington-St. Louis),
Scott Soames (USC), Ken Taylor (Stanford), and Howard Wettstein (UCR).

Essays of up to 5-6,000 words (30-40 minutes reading time) can be
submitted through January 15, 2010. Papers from any area that address
philosophical issues related to reference and referring are requested.
Graduate students and individuals in other disciplines are welcome to
submit essays. Send your essay in PDF format and prepared for blind
review as an email attachment to ...@uidaho.edu>. Please mention
the title of your essay in the body of the email.

Individuals will be notified of decisions regarding submissions in
February. Accepted papers will be eligible for publication, pending
editorial review, in volume ten of Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, an
edited volume to be published by MIT Press.

If you would like to act as a session chair or a commentator, please
contact ...@wsu.edu> with your areas of competence.

Additional information about this conference can be obtained at our
website: http://www.class.uidaho.edu/inpc

Sincerely,

Michael O'Rourke, University of Idaho ...@uidaho.edu>

Bill Kabasenche, Washington State University ...@wsu.edu>

INPC 13 Co-Directors

Joseph Keim Campbell, Washington State University ...@wsu.edu>

INPC Executive Director

Philosophers' Carnival 91 is...

2009-05-27T14:41:56Z

...here.

Of note (for this blog) are the following:

(1) Kris Rhodes (The Extended Cognition Blog) has a post on original vs. derived meaning.
(2) Avery Archer (The Space of Reasons) has a post on propositional indexing.

The other posts are good as well.

NDPR of Interest: Relative Truth, García-Carpintero and Kölbel (eds.)

2009-04-25T19:35:51Z

Review by Paul McCallion (U. of St. Andrews) is here.

NDPR of Interest: Griffin and Jacquette (eds.) Russell vs. Meinong

2009-04-13T19:17:29Z

I want to draw your attention to the review of Griffin and Jacquette (eds.), Russell vs. Meinong: The Legacy of "On Denoting," by Berit Brogaard, who, by the way, manages LEMMINGS.

Philosophers' Carnival 89 is...

2009-04-13T12:49:10Z

...here (hosted by Subjunctive Moods).

Of special interest (to me) are Jonathan Ichikawa's "Case Study: Stalnaker on Conditionals" at The Arché Methodology Project and Daniel Nolan's "The Age of Hyperintensionality" at Matters of Substance.

Upcoming Talks of Interest at the Midsouth

2009-04-08T17:31:00Z

Truth seekers and language lovers, the Midsouth Philosophy Conference, to be held at the Univ. of Memphis 17-18 April 2009, is approaching and now that the penultimate schedule is out I want to highlight a few talks of interest listed in chronological order. (Apologies to those not mentioned. But this is a blog devoted, first and foremost, to truth and semantics. If, however, I missed something relevant to those areas then don't hesitate to let me know. My criterion for inclusion is title of paper. So mistakes can be made.)

FRIDAY, SESSION 3, 5:00-5:50

3B: Hassman, Benjamin University of Iowa
Battling Paradox: Recapturing Reference for (Some) Sorites-Susceptible Predicates
Commentator: Choi, Andrew The Ohio State University

3G: Floyd, Kamper University of Southern Mississippi
Rorty and the Value of Truth
Commentator: Karofsky, Amy Hofstra University

SATURDAY, SESSION 4, 9:00-9:50

4I: Karofsky, Amy Hofstra University
Against Contingent Truth
Commentator: Shaeffer, Howard Benjamin Humboldt State University

SATURDAY, SESSION 6, 11:00-11:50

6B: Martínez-Manrique, Fernando University of Granada
On the Distinction between Semantic and Conceptual Representation
Commentator: Butler, Jesse University of Central Arkansas

6I: Asay, Jamin The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
How to Express Ontological Commitment in the Vernacular
Commentator: Gibson, Joel University of Maryland
]]> SATURDAY, SESSION 7, 1:30-2:20

7C: Horton, Michael University of South Alabama
Multiple Realizability about Truth: Uninterpretable Languages?
Commentator: Hassman, Benjamin University of Iowa

SATURDAY, SESSION 8, 2:30-3:20

8C: McCulley, Sarah Ohio University
Davidson's Semantical Primitives and Why They Cannot Work
Commentator: Stencil, Eric University of Wisconsin-Madison

SATURDAY, SESSION 10, 4:30-5:20

10B: Waller, Sara Case Western Reserve University
Content-Free "Content" and Low Quality Qualia
Commentator: Barnard, Robert University of Mississippi

TRUTH: CURRENT DEBATES (UConn) May 15-17, 2009

2009-04-01T17:34:46Z

I just found out about a great conference going on May 15-17, 2009, at the University of Connecticut on truth. The lineup is excellent:

JC Beall (UConn)
Marian David (Notre Dame)
Pascal Engel (Geneva)
Patrick Greenough
(St. Andrews/Arché)
Max Kölbel (Birmingham)
Michael Lynch (UConn)
Vann McGee (MIT)
Gila Sher (UCSD)
Crispin Wright
(St. Andrews/Arché, NYU)

Space is limited. Visit the website for more information.

Description follows.

]]>
Some of the most basic questions concerning truth ask for its nature: in what does truth consist? Does it even have a nature? And is that nature one or many?

The objective of this conference is to foster discussion that will shed new light on the nature of truth. A particular emphasis will be placed on how one might oppose traditional approaches to truth according to which the nature of truth (i) is to be accounted for in terms of a substantive property (such as correspondence or coherence) and (ii) is uniform across all truth-apt domains. Among the issues to be addressed in relation to this question are the following:

What is the most viable way of rejecting (i), i.e. what is the strongest version of deflationism about truth?
What is the most viable way of rejecting (ii) i.e. what is the strongest version of pluralism about truth?
What is the most viable way of combining a rejections of (i) and (ii), i.e. what is the strongest version of deflationary pluralism about truth?
How does a commitment to deflationism, pluralism or a combination of the two impact our understanding of other philosophically important concepts, such as meaning, content, representation, valid inference, knowledge, and the normativity of truth? Depending on one's commitments, must such accounts be "deflated", "pluralized", or abandoned altogether?
What, if any, is the relationship between pluralism about truth and pluralism about logic?
What, if any, is the relationship between pluralism about truth and pluralism about ontology?
What objections are there to pluralism? To deflationism? To deflationary pluralism?

87th Philosophers' Carnival is...

2009-03-04T20:27:48Z

...here.

Philosophers' Carnival 84...

2009-01-02T16:57:42Z

...is here.

Truth's Realizers: A problem for translation?

2009-01-02T13:55:45Z

There have been several challenges to the multiple realizability framework (MR). Kim (1992) argues by analogy that 'pain' is like 'jade', the latter being a non-projectible term since the property expressed just is the disjunction jadeite or nephrite. In the case of 'pain', assuming causal closure of the physical and causal inheritance, pain just is the disjunction of its realizers. Since disjunctions of heterogeneous properties are unfit for inclusion in laws, 'pain' is unfit for inclusion in laws.
     Recently, a colleague of mine, Ted Poston, and I have been developing a paper (presented at the Alabama Philosophical Society's 2008 meeting under the title, "Alethic Functionalism and the Metaphysics of Reduction") arguing that Kim's argument applies to alethic functionalism, a view developed by Michael Lynch (UConn) which holds that truth is a higher-order, multiply realizable property. In this post I don't want to consider that argument; rather I want to consider something tangentially related, namely the issue of translation.
     Assumptions:
    (1) Genuine MR properties are autonomous (non-reducible).
    (2) Truth is a genuine MR property.
From this it follows that
    (3) Truth is non-reducible.

What sense of autonomy are we working with here? Although several commentators have sought to avoid Kim's conclusion in different ways (see Antony (2003), Antony and Levine (1997), David (1997), I want to focus on Fodor's (1997) "Special Sciences: Still Autonomous after All These Years." In that piece Fodor argues that the disjunction of a higher-order property's realizers must be "metaphysically open" in order to avoid the identification of the higher-order property with the disjunction for the reason that disjunctions are unfit for inclusion in laws while higher-order, genuine MR properties are fit for inclusion in laws.

    (4) A disjunction of realizers for a property P is metaphysically open when there exist metaphysically possible but non-actual realizers for P.

Jade is not a genuine MR property because it just is either jadeite or nephrite.   Pain, on the other hand, is a genuine MR property because there exist metaphysically possible but non-actual realizers for pain (a state of a computer, say).
    Enough by way of summary. In this post I want to argue that this view has a surprising implication. Let me note that for Lynch discourses are not contexts (in the semanticists sense). Discourses can be thought of as sets of sentences (or propositions, if you like) such that all members of a set have the same "near perfect" realizer, where a discourse's near perfect realizer will be the property playing the "truth role" for that discourse. For my purposes, it does not matter how they are determined (whether a priori, etc.). Let me add a few more assumptions.

    (5) If a sentence S of L translates a sentence R of L2 then S and R have the same realizer property, that is, S and R belong to the same discourse.

I am not going to argue for a specific view of translation, but suffice it to say that many anti-reductionists argue by way of failure of regimentation of recalcitrant sentences into a less problematic idiom to the non-reducibility of the former (or its metaphysical commitments) to the latter (to its metaphysical commitments). If translation ensures reduction one way or the other then sentences standing in the translation relation to one another must have the same metaphysical commitments and hence must belong to the same discourse.

     Now, (6) If x is a genuine MR property then x has a metaphysically open disjunction of realizers. [Fodor's claim]

    So, (7) truth has a metaphysically open disjunction of realizers. [from (1), (2), (6)]

But then (8) there exist metaphysically possible but non-actual realizers for truth (or non-actual discourses) [from (7) and (4)]
    Let's call one such non-actual discourse NA.

    (9) NA contains a sentence S (or proposition S) belonging to a non-actual discourse with a non-actual realizer for truth. [from (8) and definition of discourse]

    (10) If S were translatable into a sentence of an actual language then it would belong to an actual discourse. [from (5)]

    But (11) S doesn't belong to an actual discourse. [from (9)]

    Hence, (12) there exists a discourse with a sentence (or proposition) untranslatable (or unexpressible) by any sentence belonging to a language in the actual world. [from (10), (11), (9)].

Long story short, if one thinks that truth is a genuine MR property and that such properties have metaphysically open disjunctions of realizers, then one is committed to the existence of in principle untranslatable but metaphysically possible languages (or language fragments).

Soul for sale? You bet. Refutation of Descartes? Hmm...

2008-07-03T14:52:28Z

According to CNN.com, Walter Scott, 24, of New Zealand, sold his soul to Hell's Pizza for $3800. See story here. He tried to list it on TradeMe, but the item was taken town because it was deemed in bad taste. What's interesting is that a 21 year old US student tried to sell his soul on Ebay but the auction was taken town because the company ruled that something tangible needed to be exchanged for a viable sale. But are there problems with selling one's soul? I don't recall any religion saying one has to own one's soul in order to enter the pearly gates, only that one's soul be pure, good, etc. Does it really matter who owns it? I mean, if it's my soul, it's still me.
But let's look at the logic of it for a second and let's assume that I am identical to my soul (a la Descartes). The following principle seems plausible: If x = y then x can't own y. I can own lots of things, but if I own something then it follows that the thing I own is separate from the thing doing the owning. Right? If so then I don't own my soul. But if I don't own it then I can't sell it? Therefore if Scott sold his soul then he is not identical to his soul and if Scott is identical to his soul then the sale of his soul was illegitimate (where by an 'illegitimate sale' I understand at least a sale of something one does not own). Therefore Descartes is wrong to identify me with my soul if souls can be sold. Souls can be sold (W. Scott did it). Therefore Descartes is wrong. Thoughts?

[Too simplistic a view of Descartes? Maybe. But let's have some fun with it.]

1st annual Interdisciplinary Approach to Philosophical Issues Conference (2008) - CFP

2008-07-01T16:44:34Z

1st annual Interdisciplinary Approach to Philosophical Issues Conference (2008)

Hosted by the University of South Alabama

This year's theme will be "At the Crossroads of Philosophy and Psychology"

Sponsored by University of South Alabama Philosophy Department

September 19-20 2008

Keynote speaker: Joshua Knobe, University of North Carolina

Submissions are due no later than August 1. Early submissions are encouraged.

]]> Presentations should be 20 to 30 minutes in length. Presentations will be followed by commentary and audience discussion.

Papers should be prepared for blind review.

The cover page should include the following:

1) author's name
2) professional or student submission (note: advanced students are welcome to submit "upwards")
3) institutional affiliation
4) email address
5) telephone number
6) the paper's title
7) an abstract - 150 words maximum

Papers in any area of philosophy are welcome, but papers in the area of philosophy of psychology, broadly construed, will be given special consideration. Philosophy of psychology, broadly construed, includes, but is not limited to, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of cognitive science, philosophy of moral psychology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, action theory, artificial intelligence, rationality, philosophical psychology, etc. We encourage papers from across all disciplines, as long as the papers are philosophical in nature.

Student papers - undergraduate or graduate - in any area of philosophy are welcome, but papers in the area of philosophy of psychology, broadly construed, will be given special consideration. Philosophy of psychology, broadly construed, includes, but is not limited to, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of cognitive science, philosophy of moral psychology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, action theory, artificial intelligence, rationality, philosophical psychology, etc. We encourage papers from students across all disciplines, as long as the papers are philosophical in nature.

There will be a $15 conference fee for student submitters, payable at the conference. A prize will be awarded to the best student paper.

There will be a $25 conference fee for professional presenters, payable at the conference.

Papers should be emailed to jss310@jaguar1.usouthal.edu no later than August 1.
Questions can be emailed to jss310@jaguar1.usouthal.edu.