TRUTH: CURRENT DEBATES (UConn) May 15-17, 2009

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Some of the most basic questions concerning truth ask for
its nature: in what does truth consist? Does it even have
a nature? And is that nature one or many?



The objective of this conference is to foster discussion
that will shed new light on the nature of truth. A
particular emphasis will be placed on how one might oppose
traditional approaches to truth according to which the nature
of truth (i) is to be accounted for in terms of a substantive
property (such as correspondence or coherence) and (ii) is
uniform across all truth-apt domains. Among the issues to be
addressed in relation to this question are the following:

• What is the most viable way of rejecting (i), i.e. what is
  the strongest version of deflationism about truth?
  
• What is the most viable way of rejecting (ii) i.e. what is
  the strongest version of pluralism about truth?
  
• What is the most viable way of combining a rejections of
  (i) and (ii), i.e. what is the strongest version of deflationary
  pluralism about truth?
  
• How does a commitment to deflationism, pluralism or a
  combination of the two impact our understanding of other
  philosophically important concepts, such as meaning, content,
  representation, valid inference, knowledge, and the normativity
  of truth? Depending on one's commitments, must such accounts
  be "deflated", "pluralized", or abandoned altogether?
  
• What, if any, is the relationship between pluralism
  about truth and pluralism about logic?
  
• What, if any, is the relationship between pluralism about
  truth and pluralism about ontology?
  
• What objections are there to pluralism? To deflationism?
  To deflationary pluralism?