Well, household duties required more of me than expected. But here's what's coming up. I've just begun Sainsbury's Reference without Referents (OUP, 2005). For each chapter, seven in all, I'll post a short review online. I'll link them together under the title/category "Sainsbury" for future reference. The first one will be up tomorrow. Below is a little fun for now.
Internalism and Faith
WF (warrant and faith): It is necessarily false that a person S both could be warranted in believing that P and also could have faith that P.
The intuition driving this claim, which I regard as false, just to let the cat out of the bag early, is that faith seems to operate without reasons. The moment one's faith that P is made credible by sufficient warrant/justification (for the moment let's conflate the two), one ceases to have faith that P and simply to believe (rationally) that P.
This reasoning assumes a principle similar to the KK-principle, namely, a justification principle (JJ-principle): when one is justified/warranted in believing that P then one knows that one is justified/warranted in believing that P. This principle is false (let's assume for the moment, as any good externalist would). If this principle is false, then a person S could be warranted in believing that P but yet not know they are so warranted. Because they do not know the epistemic status of their belief that P, they could still decide that P is something in which they ought to believe and so begin to believe P without epistemic reasons, just because, that is they begin having faith that P. If at some time the justificatory status of P changes with respect to the believer, but they don't know it, then they might both be justified in believing P and have faith that P. However, they cannot have faith that P and not know they have faith that P, right?
