Nothing but the Truth-in-L

...here. 

Of note (for this blog) are the following:

(1) Kris Rhodes (The Extended Cognition Blog) has a post on original vs. derived meaning.
(2) Avery Archer (The Space of Reasons) has a post on propositional indexing.

The other posts are good as well.

Review by Paul McCallion (U. of St. Andrews) is here.

I want to draw your attention to the review of Griffin and Jacquette (eds.), Russell vs. Meinong: The Legacy of "On Denoting," by Berit Brogaard, who, by the way, manages LEMMINGS.   

...here (hosted by Subjunctive Moods).

Of special interest (to me) are Jonathan Ichikawa's "Case Study: Stalnaker on Conditionals" at The Arché Methodology Project and Daniel Nolan's "The Age of Hyperintensionality" at Matters of Substance.

Truth seekers and language lovers, the Midsouth Philosophy Conference, to be held at the Univ. of Memphis 17-18 April 2009, is approaching and now that the penultimate schedule is out I want to highlight a few talks of interest listed in chronological order.  (Apologies to those not mentioned.  But this is a blog devoted, first and foremost, to truth and semantics.  If, however, I missed something relevant to those areas then don't hesitate to let me know.  My criterion for inclusion is title of paper.  So mistakes can be made.)

FRIDAY, SESSION 3, 5:00-5:50

3B: Hassman, Benjamin <benjamin-hassman@uiowa.edu> University of Iowa
Battling Paradox: Recapturing Reference for (Some) Sorites-Susceptible Predicates
Commentator: Choi, Andrew <choi.402@osu.edu> The Ohio State University

3G: Floyd, Kamper <kamper.floyd@usm.edu> University of Southern Mississippi
Rorty and the Value of Truth
Commentator: Karofsky, Amy <phiadk@hofstra.edu> Hofstra University

SATURDAY, SESSION 4, 9:00-9:50

4I: Karofsky, Amy <phiadk@hofstra.edu> Hofstra University
Against Contingent Truth
Commentator: Shaeffer, Howard Benjamin <hbs1@humboldt.edu> Humboldt State University

SATURDAY, SESSION 6, 11:00-11:50

6B: Martínez-Manrique, Fernando <fmmanriq@ugr.es> University of Granada
On the Distinction between Semantic and Conceptual Representation
Commentator: Butler, Jesse <jbutler@uca.edu> University of Central Arkansas

6I: Asay, Jamin <asay@email.unc.edu> The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
How to Express Ontological Commitment in the Vernacular
Commentator: Gibson, Joel <joel_gibson11@hotmail.com> University of Maryland

I just found out about a great conference going on May 15-17, 2009, at the University of Connecticut on truth.  The lineup is excellent:

• JC Beall (UConn)
• Marian David (Notre Dame)
• Pascal Engel (Geneva)
• Patrick Greenough
  (St. Andrews/Arché)
• Max Kölbel (Birmingham)
• Michael Lynch (UConn)
• Vann McGee (MIT)
• Gila Sher (UCSD)
• Crispin Wright
  (St. Andrews/Arché, NYU)

Space is limited.  Visit the website for more information.

Description follows.

...here.

...is here.

There have been several challenges to the multiple realizability framework (MR).  Kim (1992) argues by analogy that 'pain' is like 'jade', the latter being a non-projectible term since the property expressed just is the disjunction jadeite or nephrite.  In the case of 'pain', assuming causal closure of the physical and causal inheritance, pain just is the disjunction of its realizers.  Since disjunctions of heterogeneous properties are unfit for inclusion in laws, 'pain' is unfit for inclusion in laws.
     Recently, a colleague of mine, Ted Poston, and I have been developing a paper (presented at the Alabama Philosophical Society's 2008 meeting under the title, "Alethic Functionalism and the Metaphysics of Reduction") arguing that Kim's argument applies to alethic functionalism, a view developed by Michael Lynch (UConn) which holds that truth is a higher-order, multiply realizable property.  In this post I don't want to consider that argument; rather I want to consider something tangentially related, namely the issue of translation.
     Assumptions:
    (1) Genuine MR properties are autonomous (non-reducible).
    (2) Truth is a genuine MR property.
From this it follows that
    (3) Truth is non-reducible.

What sense of autonomy are we working with here?  Although several commentators have sought to avoid Kim's conclusion in different ways (see Antony (2003), Antony and Levine (1997), David (1997), I want to focus on Fodor's (1997) "Special Sciences: Still Autonomous after All These Years."  In that piece Fodor argues that the disjunction of a higher-order property's realizers must be "metaphysically open" in order to avoid the identification of the higher-order property with the disjunction for the reason that disjunctions are unfit for inclusion in laws while higher-order, genuine MR properties are fit for inclusion in laws.  

    (4) A  disjunction of realizers for a property P is metaphysically open when there exist metaphysically possible but non-actual realizers for P. 

Jade is not a genuine MR property because it just is either jadeite or nephrite.   Pain, on the other hand, is a genuine MR property because there exist metaphysically possible but non-actual realizers for pain (a state of a computer, say).
    Enough by way of summary.  In this post I want to argue that this view has a surprising implication.  Let me note that for Lynch discourses are not contexts (in the semanticists sense).  Discourses can be thought of as sets of sentences (or propositions, if you like) such that all members of a set have the same "near perfect" realizer, where a discourse's near perfect realizer will be the property playing the "truth role" for that discourse.  For my purposes, it does not matter how they are determined (whether a priori, etc.).  Let me add a few more assumptions.

    (5) If a sentence S of L translates a sentence R of L2 then S and R have the same realizer property, that is, S and R belong to the same discourse.

I am not going to argue for a specific view of translation, but suffice it to say that many anti-reductionists argue by way of failure of regimentation of recalcitrant sentences into a less problematic idiom to the non-reducibility of the former (or its metaphysical commitments) to the latter (to its metaphysical commitments).  If translation ensures reduction one way or the other then sentences standing in the translation relation to one another must have the same metaphysical commitments and hence must belong to the same discourse.

     Now, (6) If x is a genuine MR property then x has a metaphysically open disjunction of realizers.  [Fodor's claim]

    So, (7) truth has a metaphysically open disjunction of realizers.  [from (1), (2), (6)]

But then (8) there exist metaphysically possible but non-actual realizers for truth (or non-actual discourses)  [from (7) and (4)]
    Let's call one such non-actual discourse NA.

    (9)  NA contains a sentence S (or proposition S) belonging to a non-actual discourse with a non-actual realizer for truth.  [from (8) and definition of discourse]

    (10)  If S were translatable into a sentence of an actual language then it would belong to an actual discourse. [from (5)]

    But (11) S doesn't belong to an actual discourse. [from (9)]

    Hence, (12) there exists a discourse with a sentence (or proposition) untranslatable (or unexpressible) by any sentence belonging to a language in the actual world. [from (10), (11), (9)].

Long story short, if one thinks that truth is a genuine MR property and that such properties have metaphysically open disjunctions of realizers, then one is committed to the existence of in principle untranslatable but metaphysically possible languages (or language fragments).

 

According to CNN.com, Walter Scott, 24, of New Zealand, sold his soul to Hell's Pizza for $3800.  See story here.  He tried to list it on TradeMe, but the item was taken town because it was deemed in bad taste.  What's interesting is that a 21 year old US student tried to sell his soul on Ebay but the auction was taken town because the company ruled that something tangible needed to be exchanged for a viable sale.  But are there problems with selling one's soul?  I don't recall any religion saying one has to own one's soul in order to enter the pearly gates, only that one's soul be pure, good, etc.  Does it really matter who owns it?  I mean, if it's my soul, it's still me. 
     But let's look at the logic of it for a second and let's assume that I am identical to my soul (a la Descartes).  The following principle seems plausible: If x = y then x can't own y.  I can own lots of things, but if I own something then it follows that the thing I own is separate from the thing doing the owning.  Right?  If so then I don't own my soul.  But if I don't own it then I can't sell it?  Therefore if Scott sold his soul then he is not identical to his soul and if Scott is identical to his soul then the sale of his soul was illegitimate (where by an 'illegitimate sale' I understand at least a sale of something one does not own).  Therefore Descartes is wrong to identify me with my soul if souls can be sold.  Souls can be sold (W. Scott did it).  Therefore Descartes is wrong.  Thoughts?

[Too simplistic a view of Descartes?  Maybe.  But let's have some fun with it.]